The beginning of April saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
holding its largest summit in the Romanian capital of Bucharest. This
was also hailed as one of the most successful, given widespread
consensus on focusing on the spring operations in Afghanistan. Much as
the United States tried to obtain greater commitment of troops to the
ground battles in Kandahar and Helmand, it was only the French led by
Nicholas Sarkozy, Poland seeking a lead role in Central Europe keeping
with the power configuration in the area and states as Czech Republic
were willing to add boots on the ground. Finally it was left to the
United States to promise increased deployment in 2009, after sending
over 2000 marines to Southern Afghanistan.
A Year is likely to be a long period in the guerrilla war in Afghanistan
which claimed between 6000-8000 lives in 2007. The Taliban, NATO’s
principal foe in Afghanistan however was forging a, ‘smart’ strategy in
conjunction with old ally, Al Qaeda and the Tehreek e Taliban, Pakistan
(TTP).
These terrorist groups were facing the heat of combined military
operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the past eight months or so
after the Lal Masjid episode in June 2007. The Swat Valley over which
Mullah Fazlullah held sway was reclaimed by the army with the terrorists
melting away in the hills. Despite the large number of suicide attacks
launched including the most fateful one on Benazir Bhutto, the Taliban
and the Al Qaeda was on the retreat at least in Afghanistan. This was
acknowledged by US officials on more than one occasion.
The US 82nd Airborne Division having finished its tour of duty was quick
to point out the successes achieved in Eastern Afghanistan, its
principal deployment area. This would not have been possible without
active suppression of militancy in the North West Frontier Province and
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The portends were
thus ominous for the Taliban and sustained operations during the
spring-summer 2008 would have severely constrained its capacity,
particularly when the local population seems to be disenchanted with
violence.
More over the central leadership of the Al Qaeda which has a safe
sanctuary on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would have been critically
impacted. With heavy troop presence in these areas on both sides of the
Durand Line, their survival would have been difficult.
Yet the Al Qaeda, TTP and Afghan Taliban have a much more coordinated
strategy than their counterpart, the governments in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and the International Security Assistance Force and NATO. They
quickly seized the opportunity of the turn of the political tide in
Pakistan when the new government in Islamabad and particularly in
Peshawar, under the Pakistan People’s Party and the Awami National Party
respectively, wanting to prove its people friendly policies decided to
adopt a, “comprehensive approach”. This entailed a combination of
military, political and development initiatives to drive away the root
causes of militancy as well as deny infra structure and constrict
operational space for the terrorists.
What has emerged however is a policy of appeasement of the terrorist
groups, who seem to have deftly reciprocated by avoiding any suicide
attacks for a five week period after February, till the lull was broken
a couple of days back in Mardan, the home constituency of the Chief
Minister of the ruling Awami National Party in Peshawar.
During this period, we are told that a 15 point agreement is being
worked out with of all the persons, Baitullah Mehsud of the TTP who is
alleged to have ordered assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The rough
contours of this Deal indicate that the military will pull out of the
tribal areas of South Waziristan and the TTP will ensure that it would
keep peace as well as deny sanctuaries to foreign elements, including
Taliban operating in Afghanistan.
There are many missing links to this agreement, the principle ones being
of restricting access to fighters operating in Afghanistan for rest and
recuperation in Waziristan in Pakistan, an agreement that the TTP will
not operate in Afghanistan and turn away foreign fighters an euphemism
for the Al Qaeda.
What mechanisms if any will be put into place for monitoring these and
other clauses of the Agreement are not known so far. For unless these
are worked out the present peace agreement will flounder as many before
it, be it in South Waziristan in 2005 or the North in September 2006,
both of which provided unhindered access to the miscreants operating in
Afghanistan against NATO forces.
On the face of it, the Al Qaeda and the Taliban seem to have obtained
sizeable concessions from the new Pakistan government, the adverse
impact of which is likely to be seen in the days ahead in Afghanistan.
Thus Kabul has been most unhappy with these machinations of the Pakistan
government and has made it amply clear that this would increase violence
in the Year ahead. The Taliban’s ‘smart strategy’ thus has ensured that
it has obtained the freedom to operate as well as secured the lair for
the Al Qaeda command.
The Pakistan government’s urge to try something different from the
previous regime is appreciated, but unless there are iron clad
guarantees that the Taliban would stand by its part of the Deal, the
death toll in Afghanistan is likely to rise in the year ahead. As it
appears, the cycle of Deal-Violence-Deal-Violence in Pakistan seems to
be going on interminably. Hopefully this time around we should expect
that past experience would have led the Government to pin the TTP down
to its promises.
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