Opinion 2007 Gave India Some Relief
in Terror Attacks by
Ajay Sahni
The year 2007 saw
2,465 fatalities (957 civilians, 383 security personnel and 1,125
terrorists, all data for 2007 till Dec 11) as a result of terrorist
violence in an unrelenting succession of incidents across India, well
beyond the boundaries of the established theatres of terrorism.
Some of the worst incidents included the bombing of the Delhi-Attari
Samjhauta Express train in which 68 people were killed Feb 18; the
killing of 55 police personnel in a swarming attack by Maoists at Rani
Bodli in Chhattisgarh March 15 (one of several such attacks by Maoists
which inflicted double digit fatalities); serial blasts in Hyderabad May
18 and Aug 25 in which 11 and 44 people respectively were killed; and
the coordinated explosion in court premises in Varanasi, Faizabad and
Lucknow Nov 23.
Despite a steady stream of terrorist incidents virtually across the
country, 2007 reflected some relief in virtually several major theatres
of terrorism in India. Total fatalities were down marginally from the
2006 figure of 2,765, with dramatic improvements in Jammu and Kashmir,
where terrorism related killings - at 768 - fell below the 'high
intensity conflict' mark of a thousand deaths for the first time since
1990 (when they stood at 1,177). At their peak in 2001, fatalities had
risen to 4,507.
Clearly, 2007 is a watershed year for the beleaguered state, bringing
tremendous relief to its people. The situation in the northeast,
however, worsened considerably, with total fatalities more than
doubling, from 427 in 2006 to 947 in 2007, principally because of a
dramatic escalation in terrorist activities in Assam (up at 408, from
174) and Manipur (372 from 280). There was a marginal decline in
fatalities in Maoist violence, from 742 in 2006 to 613 in 2007.
The sheer spread of terrorist incidents - particularly the widening
sphere of Islamist terrorist attacks and Maoist depredations - give
particular cause for concern. This concern was infinitely compounded by
the spectacle of chaotic responses in the aftermath of each incident,
the inability, in many cases, of the police and paramilitary forces even
to protect themselves against attacks, the failure of investigators to
secure breakthroughs in most of the major cases of Islamist attacks, and
the utter inanity of political declarations in the wake of each major
incident.
If one were to ask, at the end of this year - indeed, at the end of
decades of relentless terrorism - whether 'India' has learned how to
respond to extremist violence, the answer would be an unqualified
negative. There is no coherence in the 'national response' to terrorism,
no evidence of consistent strategy or policy perspective, no
institutional memory or visible learning process within the various
institutions of governance to derive the lessons of past campaigns and
counter-terrorism experience in various theatres and to device
protocols, strategies and tactics of appropriate response.
It is the rare success, within this context, that underlines the
magnitude of this failure.
In Andhra Pradesh, a counter-terrorism campaign based on a coherent
understanding of Maoist strategy and tactics and on lessons derived from
the successes of other theatres, particularly Punjab, has virtually
wiped out the Naxalite threat from a state that was, till 2005, the
worst afflicted in the country (accounting for 320 of a total of 717
Naxalism-related fatalities in that year).
In under three years of unremitting intelligence-led operations, and
after a continuous augmentation of the state's policing and intelligence
capabilities, virtually the entire state has been cleared, leaving just
four districts along the Andhra-Orissa border as a residual problem to
be resolved.
There is today much loose talk about other Naxalite-affected states
following the 'Andhra model', but little evidence of any of the other
states even beginning the journey in this direction. In the interim,
there is overwhelming evidence that the limited 'gains' in terms of
declining Maoist violence outside Andhra Pradesh are the result not of
any significant initiatives on the part of the state's agencies, but
rather of a Maoist decision to focus on political and mass mobilization
in order to "intensify the people's war throughout the country".
The impact of this decision is already visible in the rampaging
footprint of Maoist 'partial struggles', the activities of extremist
front organizations far outside the earlier confines of the 'Red
corridor', the establishment of five 'regional bureaus', 13 'State
Committees', two 'Special Area Committees' and three 'Special Zonal
Committees' and the framing of an 'urban strategy', which cumulatively
cover virtually the length and breadth of India.
Far from confronting this subversive onslaught, the incompetence of
governments - most dramatically the West Bengal government and its
actions in Nandigram, but less visibly in several other states - has
presented the Maoists with proliferating opportunities to deepen
subversive mobilization and recruitment.
In Jammu and Kashmir, again, the trajectory of declining violence has
little correlation with specific changes in operational strategies or
tactics, or with the range of 'peace initiatives' the government has
undertaken domestically and with Pakistan. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the downward trend in violence has been consistently sustained
since 2001, irrespective of the transient character of relationships
between India and Pakistan, or any escalation or decline of operations
within Jammu and Kashmir, and has been maintained even through periods
of escalating tension and provocative political rhetoric.
This trend commenced immediately after the 9/11 attacks in the US and
the subsequent threat by the US for Pakistan to "be prepared to be
bombed back into the Stone Age". It was this threat, a steady build-up
of international pressure, and intense international media focus on
Pakistan's role in the sponsorship of terrorism that combined to force
Pakistan to execute a U-turn in its policy on Afghanistan, and dilute
visible support to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
Thereafter, the unrelenting succession of crises in Pakistan has
undermined the country's capabilities to sustain past levels of
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir - particularly since a large proportion
of troops had to be pulled back from the Line of Control and the
international border for deployment in increasingly violent theatres in
Balochistan, NWFP and the FATA areas. Pakistan's creeping implosion has
undermined the establishment's capabilities to sustain the 'proxy war'
against India at earlier levels.
Regrettably, if Western attention is diverted from the region, or if the
Islamists in Pakistan are able to carve out autonomous capacities and
regions, free of their dependence on the state's covert agencies, or if
there is a radical escalation in the 'global jihad' in the wake of the
proposed US withdrawal from Iraq in the foreseeable future, the
developments in Kashmir could once again find the state unprepared as
the situation spirals out of control.
The unfortunate reality of India's counter-terrorism response and
postures is that there is utter incoherence, an absence of consensus
even on basic strategy, chronic and endemic capacity deficits in
policing and intelligence gathering, a further inefficiency in
utilization of available capacities, poor understanding of terrorist
objectives, strategies and tactics, and fitful and ad hoc
counter-terrorism initiatives with no sustained operational thrust.
The principal responsibility for these complex failures lies in the
political executive of the states and in New Delhi where confusion
abounds and a lack of will undermines the mandate and obstructs
necessary capability building in the security apparatus.
(Ajay Sahni is Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management. He can be reached at
ajaisahni@gmail.com)
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