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Opinion
Post-Kabul Attack,
India Needs to be More Assertive in Afghanistan
by Brig Arun Sahgal and V.K. Anand
The
vehicle-borne suicide bomb attack at the entrance of the Indian embassy
in Kabul and the resultant casualties have created a furor in the Indian
national security establishment and the diplomatic community.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai immediately blamed the "enemies of
Afghanistan-India friendship" for the bombing - an obvious reference to
Pakistan. The Afghan interior ministry, in its pronouncement, was quite
upfront when it made an official statement announcing that "this attack
was carried out in coordination and consultation with an active
intelligence service in the region".
No prizes for guessing as to who that might be: Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is the infamous mentor of the
Taliban and has a record of aiding and abetting terrorist and militant
activities against Indian interests in Afghanistan and all across in
India's hinterland besides Kashmir. In fact, attacks against Indian road
construction workers and engineers have taken place regularly to signal
that Indians are not welcome in Afghanistan. Such attacks though carried
out by Taliban groups have been ascribed to the guidance given by ISI.
The Indian embassy too picked the gauntlet and Indian Ambassador to
Afghanistan Jayant Prasad squarely blamed Pakistan for the dastardly
attack quoting detailed briefings by the Afghan interior ministry. This
has now been confirmed by no less a person than Indian National Security
Advisor (NSA) M.K. Narayanan, who, in an interview with a TV news
channel, squarely held ISI responsible for the dastardly attack and made
a startling revelation - accusing it of planning three or more attacks
on Indian interests and consulates.
Coming from the NSA, it is a serious development having implications on
India-Pakistan relations and the future of the peace process and joint
anti-terror mechanism on which question marks are being raised.
The Pakistani government and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, on the
other hand, have been quick to denounce all references to Pakistani
involvement as unfounded and malicious. Pakistani commentators are
saying that the country itself is under the militancy siege to think of
attacking Indian interests in a third country. Ironically, while the
Pakistani claims may have merit, the hand of the Pakistani intelligence
establishment and other interested parties which function beyond the
pale of governmental control, particularly at the present juncture where
the new democratic government is yet to establish control and the
military at best remains ambivalent, cannot be ruled out.
It is well recognized that training and logistic support for much of
Taliban activities in Afghanistan is coming from across the borders in
the restive region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
the increasingly troubled tribal areas of the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP). Additionally, despite protestations to the contrary,
there is close collaboration in the activities of the Afghan Taliban and
the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan). Because of the
flip-flop policies of the Pakistani establishment, Al Qaeda and Taliban
have acquired ascendancy in FATA and its adjoining areas.
The bombing of the Kabul embassy has all the characteristics of a
professional job and bears the stamp of Al Qaeda and Taliban and, above
all, complicity of ISI. Even though the new Taliban leaders are
increasingly becoming autonomous and not often under the control and
guidance of ISI, it nonetheless continues to maintain nexus with some of
the older Taliban elements like the Jalaluddin Haqqani group that is not
much enamored with Mullah Omar and his ilk.
Further, many institutions of Afghan security like the Afghan National
Army and the Afghan Police are known to have been infiltrated by Al
Qaeda and Taliban elements. Even among the Afghan population, there are
a number of sympathizers for Taliban and Al Qaeda who could have
provided crucial information on the movement of Indian embassy staff,
including the military attaché who was killed.
ISI operatives would have also kept a close tag on the activities of the
military attaché and other Indian embassy staff. The type of explosives
used and the manner of attack all point towards a well-planned and
executed operation. The suicide bomber apparently was well motivated and
trained in Taliban-run suicide bombing schools of Waziristan.
What could have been the motivation for such an attack? First and
foremost is the fact that the Indian profile in Afghanistan is
increasing by the day. Reconstruction and developmental activities by
India have found great resonance with the Afghan population.
Construction of power projects, improving road connectivity, aid for
rural development projects including education and health and other
developmental activities designed to help the common population have
increased India's soft power in Afghanistan.
Such development initiatives to the tune of $750 million-plus and
India's proximity to the Afghan government are viewed by Pakistan and
Taliban as direct Indian attempts at enhancing its strategic space
within the larger construct of current Afghan strategic scenario. The
growing India-US strategic partnership has further enhanced India's
profile and radical Islamic elements see India as firmly on the side of
the US and NATO as far as the Afghan imbroglio is concerned. They
perceive India as an enemy of the Islamic emirate.
Added to this, Pakistan has been off and on expressing concern at the
supposed activities of India's "oversized embassy" (incompatible with
its commercial or consular interests) at Kabul and four consulates at
Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-I-Sharif. Former Pakistani interior
minister Faisal Saleh had stated: "India was establishing diplomatic
offices in Afghanistan's cities where their presence could not be
justified. We fear these Indian missions and consulate will serve
purposes other than diplomacy".
In August 2007, during the famous Grand Jirga, Pakistan had put forward
a proposal to Afghanistan, US and NATO representatives regarding the
winding up of India's consulates. Afghanistan rejected the proposal,
saying it was its internal matter.
Historically, Pakistan has always competed with India for influence in
Afghanistan. During the years of Taliban rule (1996-2001) Pakistan toyed
with the notion of "strategic depth" in terms of its influence in
Afghanistan and as a part of its Central Asia policy. In the aftermath
of 9/11, when the Northern Alliance (NA) was about to walk into Kabul,
Pervez Musharraf influenced the Pentagon to ask the NA not to take over
Kabul since this would be a great victory for India.
Eventually, the NA did march into Kabul. Thereafter, the ISI has had
only one interest - how to prevent India from consolidating its position
in Afghanistan. In its bid to limit and eliminate what it regarded as
India's growing influence in its backyard, the ISI systematically helped
Taliban by letting it establish itself in FATA.
Ahmed Rashid, the well-known author and analyst on Taliban, has observed
in his latest book "Descent into Chaos" that the ISI actively protected
Taliban, knowing fully well the nexus between it and Al Qaeda.
Rashid adds: "India's success had stirred up a hornet's nest in
Islamabad, which soon came to believe that India was 'taking over
Afghanistan'. India had implemented a reconstruction strategy that was
one of the best planned from any country. It was designed to win over
every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with the
Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage and of course undercut
Pakistan's influence".
One of the largest and strategically significant Indian projects has
been the construction of the Zaranj-Delaram road that would link the
Afghan Garland Highway opening a new route for the landlocked Central
Asian countries through the Iranian port of Chahbahar. Pakistan
perceives this to be at the cost of Gawadar port in Balochistan.
These developments further undermine Pakistan's salience to Afghanistan
as the single point of access to the landlocked Afghanistan and Central
Asia. Repeated attacks on Indian Border Road Organization workers should
be seen in this background. Rising influence of the Indian soft power is
also reflected in a religious diktat issued by Taliban against watching
Indian soap operas that have become very popular among the Afghans,
terming them as not being in consonance with the edicts of Islam.
Pakistan has convinced itself that a politically and economically
dependent Afghanistan is of immense strategic significance, particularly
as it is the gateway to the immense riches of Central Asia to which
India aspires. This is often referred to as a "palm and five finger
strategy" with Pakistan and Afghanistan being the palm and five central
Asian countries fingers. India with its activities in Afghanistan and
access through Iran is seen as attempting to circumvent and defeat this
Pakistani strategy - and hence the target for its ISI.
As a consequence of the bomb attack, a debate has started within the
Indian security and strategic establishment for a pro-active Indian
profile in Afghanistan. Whereas some people have been recommending an
Indian military presence in Afghanistan, others have cautioned against
such a move. A series of assessments have indicated that India should
get more actively involved in the training of Afghan military and
civilian personnel.
Greater Indian involvement in the training of the Afghan National Army
and the police, providing more vacancies to Afghan military personnel at
Indian training establishments and more stress on pro-active development
in Afghan rural areas would further consolidate Indian gains in
Afghanistan. There is also a need to provide specially trained security
forces for guarding the embassy in Kabul and consulates at the other
places in Afghanistan.
India should indicate with its actions that it intends to stay committed
in Afghanistan in spite of the terrorist threats and suicide bombings.
It needs to be a far more assertive player to protect its interests.
(Brig Arun Sehgal heads the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation
at the United Service Institution of India. He can be contacted at
arunsahgal@hotmail.com.)
July 16, 2008
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