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Opinion
Post-Musharraf Scenario:
Growing Instability in Pakistan
by Brig. Arun Sahgal
Pakistan is again in the news due to the decision of the ruling coalition to
impeach President Pervez Musharraf. India's National Security Adviser (NSA)
M.K. Narayanan said that the impeachment may give rise to a big vacuum that
will provide freedom to radical extremist elements.
In his words, "It leaves a big vacuum and we are deeply concerned about this
vacuum because it leaves the radical extremist outfits with freedom to do
what they like, not merely on the Pakistani-Afghan border but clearly on our
side of the border too."
The concern of the NSA is genuine and alludes to the post- impeachment
scenario that could lead to political turbulence and resultant deterioration
in overall security situation providing free run not only to Taliban and
other jihadi forces but to Kashmiri outfits supported by ISI.
The question now is who will replace Musharraf and how the devolution of
presidential power will take place. These are likely to become important
political sticking points. The moot question is whether the new president
will continue to exercise all the existing powers or there will be
devolution. Resolution of this will be crucial to the future of coalition
politics in Pakistan.
Two scenarios can be visualized. One, there is no change in existing
presidential powers and Musharraf is replaced by a civilian president. This
is likely to be the most attractive option for Asif Ali Zardari who appears
to be eyeing this position. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) holding the
posts of both president and prime minister will be unacceptable to Nawaz
Sharif as it effectively undermines his political position.
The second option is to devalue presidential powers in terms of his primacy
in dissolution of parliament, national assembly and dismissal of PM or even
the appointment of chief of the army staff. Devolution of presidential
powers in Pakistan will reduce his status and make him similar to that of
the Indian president. The only difference will be that he will continue to
be chairman of the National Security Council (NSC). In India NSC is under
the prime minister.
The next question: if the devolution of power does take place who will
exercise these additional powers? The obvious choice is the PM. The
delegation of these powers to Pakistan PM including control over nuclear
command authority will make him a strong player. This will enhance the
prestige and importance of the prime ministerial position from the near
figurehead at present.
How the spoils of the two offices are shared will decide the future course
of political stability and development in Pakistan. From the prevalent
trends it appears that Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Mulsim League - Nawaz (PML-N)
is likely to seek one of the two posts. The situation could become more
favourable if the 54-member PML-Q splits post Musharraf and many join the
PML-N.
The next issue is how the Pakistani Army will react to the post-Musharraf
developments, even though at the present juncture it is satisfied in playing
a low-key role. For stability in Pakistan it is important to have balance in
powers of the ruling 'Troika' - president, PM and army chief.
However, the problem is that 60 years of Pakistan history shows that the
army enjoys overwhelming and arbitrary powers. Whenever there is a tussle
between the government and the army, the latter has no hesitation in
demolishing all democratic institutions and establishing its rule. Even
though it is somewhat restrained on account of the deteriorating internal
situation and with Musharraf as president, it is likely to interfere if
devolution of power is detrimental to its position.
At this point of time, it is not clear whether the army will support Nawaz
Sharif or Zardari. Notwithstanding the political arrangement between the
two, the army is likely to introduce enough checks and balances so as to
balance the powers of the two constitutional offices.
The only wild card that can be imagined is if dissatisfied Nawaz Sharif was
to challenge the army by openly colluding with Islamist factions and playing
the anti-America card. Notwithstanding its dangerous consequences this is
something that he may do for self-preservation.
Under the circumstances if the fractious politicians are not able to come to
a sound political understanding and initiate the process of effective
governance the possibility of army rule cannot be ruled out in Pakistan. The
recent events like violation of the ceasefire agreement between India and
Pakistan and the attack on Indian embassy in Afghanistan show that the
Pakistan Army is again beginning to dictate Pakistani foreign policy. This
represents a dangerous trend.
Another possibility is that the army may ask beleaguered Musharraf to
dissolve parliament before resigning himself (with promise of immunity from
prosecution and safe passage) as was done in 1993 when both the president
and the prime minister resigned. Analysts say a caretaker government may be
installed to oversee new elections within 90 days as provided in the
constitution or an army-backed government appointed for a year or more to
dismiss tainted politicians before calling the elections.
Lastly, what is the role of the US? In the post-Musharraf scenario the US is
unlikely to support those institutional arrangements that are not in sync
with its objective of prosecuting war on terror, in particular its
determined operations against the Taliban. The situation on this front is
becoming critical with repeated setbacks to security forces and growing
stridency in Taliban operations. Given this perspective the US is likely to
be more comfortable in dealing with Zardari and General Kayani than with
Nawaz Sharif.
However, the US cannot totally ignore Nawaz Sharif for the same reason as
the army. A miffed Sharif could become a rallying point for anti-American
forces by raising nationalist feelings against the US. A second concern is
how the US will distribute future anti-terrorism funding and military aid to
Pakistan. The Bush administration has trusted Musharraf alone to pass on
these funds to the various governors in Pakistan's tribal areas bordering
Afghanistan. The US does not trust any other civilian or military
institution. This will necessarily have to change. New institutional
arrangements will indicate the political direction in which future American
support is likely to swing.
Criticality of the political and economic situation in Pakistan is not fully
appreciated. Militancy is on the rise despite attempts at engagement and
selective operations essentially to keep NATO supply lines open. The ground
perspective however is that apart from the Peshawar valley, the whole
Pashtun-dominated region of the North West Frontier Province is effectively
under the control of the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. The chaotic
state of the economy is further playing into their hands as people become
increasingly disgruntled.
On the economic front inflation is running at an exceptionally high 25
percent, the Karachi stock exchange has lost 35 percent of its value since
April, the power situation is becoming critical with frequent electricity
shutdowns and foreign exchange reserves have fallen from $17 billion last
year to $9 billion, barely enough to cover imports for three months. These
economic woes are compounded by an ongoing political crisis which Al Qaeda
is already exploiting.
The unfolding scenario portends continuing instability. The most important
issue from the Indian perspective is that as the political crisis escalates
in Pakistan it comes under increasing pressure from a resurgent Taliban,
unlawfulness and deteriorating economy, India will be used as a bogeyman to
deflect internal problems. This translated into action means greater
rhetoric on Jammu and Kashmir, stridency in tone and action to ratchet
tensions on the Line of Control and support to separatist forces in Kashmir.
(Brig Arun Sahgal (Retd) is at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses
in New Delhi and specialises on international security. He can be contacted
at arunsahgal@hotmail.com)
August 17, 2008
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