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Opinion
Will the Operation Rah-i-Nijat
Deliver?
by
Uddipan Mukherjee
 To everybody’s dismay, Hakeemullah
Mehsud, the leader-elect of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP); appeared before a small group of journalists at
Sararogha in South Waziristan on October 4 and vowed to
avenge the killing of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud.
Hakeemullah was thought to have been killed in infighting.
Surely, Hakeemullah and the TTP have abided by their words
which can be deciphered from the wave of attacks on the
Pakistani mainland since October 5, including the siege of
the Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi on October 10. The
insurgents are not sparing educational institutions either
with the International Islamic University at Islamabad being
their latest target on October 20.
Actually, the series of suicide or ‘Fidayeen’ attacks were
being carried out not only as a retaliation against the
drone-attack on Baitullah Mehsud on August 5, 2009 but also
as a pre-emptive measure against the possible onslaught to
be waged by the Pakistani Army on the Taliban stronghold in
South Waziristan. But in fact, these fatal terrorist attacks
hastened the Operation Rah-i-Nijat
embarked upon by the Pakistani Army in order to decimate the
Taliban in South Waziristan. The planning of the said
operation was going on since June 2009 but on October 17,
the Pakistani Army was probably left without any choice but
to attack. Can the ‘meticulous planning’ by the Army top
brass and the professional attitude of the soldiers
guarantee success? This is a probing question which probably
lacks an unequivocal answer.
The epicenter of the behemoth
called the Taliban lies in South Waziristan, and this is
where ‘the mother of all battles’ is being fought.
Already in April-June 2009, the Pakistani military lost more
than 300 of its soldiers in the Swat valley while ousting
the Taliban. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the
past operations against the tribal militants in South
Waziristan ended in failure. The January 2004 operation led
to the infamous Shakai peace agreement signed in April 2004,
followed by another agreement on Feb 5, 2005 with the
now-dead TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud. In late January 2008,
the military launched Operation Zalzala with the
goal of dislodging Baitullah. Barely 12 days later, the
authorities were clinging on to the previous peace
agreement.
A debate is raging within some circles if the military could
have mounted an assault shortly after Baitullah’s death,
more so when the terrain in South Waziristan is arid and
hence lack of water could have proved detrimental to the
insurgents. It appears that the Taliban-Qaeda group received
a substantial amount of ‘breathing time’. But the other
school of thought puts forward the factors of a tricky
terrain, past fiascos of the Army and the unfathomable
uncertainties as the major bottlenecks behind the
procrastination of the ground offensive. About 1,500 Uzbeks
centered around the village of Kaniguram are the most
formidable fighters on the Taliban side and hence add to the
predicament of the Pakistani musketeers.
If Pakistan wants to be exculpated from its past deeds of
propelling the Taliban to gain the so-called ‘strategic
depth’ in Afghanistan, then it needs to act in a positive
definite manner. Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) own
“Frankenstein” has to be quelled. Bravado of the Pakistani
Army notwithstanding, the attitude of the military elite is
still in doubt. The ‘India factor’ looms large on the
Pakistani strategic horizon. Indian presence in Afghanistan
and Central Asia along with present Indo-US camaraderie
enhances the skepticism and buttresses the prevailing
cynicism regarding India.
But USA would keep on pressurizing Pakistan ‘to act’ against
the Taliban and Al Qaeda, more so when through the
“Kerry-Lugar Bill” Pakistan will get a non-military aid of
$1.5 billion per year for the next five years. The bill has
been criticized in the Pakistani military circles and media
for the attached conditions. It is the US administration
which will verify and give undertaking on behalf of Pakistan
every year to the Senate that Pakistan is fulfilling the
condition mentioned in the bill. The contentious clause in
the “Kerry-Lugar Bill” is related to the US demand that
security forces of Pakistan shall not interfere in the
political and judicial processes of the country.
Will the ISI and the military accept such demands? Such a
clause might make the Pakistani military torpid with regard
to action in South Waziristan.
In an open letter to the Mehsud tribesmen, Pakistani Chief
of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani has sought their
support in the Operation Rah-i-Nijat. Apart from
the obvious tactical measure of isolating the Taliban-Qaeda
faction, the other thing that emerges from this act is the
primacy of the Army vis-à-vis the civil administration.
Well, if Pakistan has to ‘survive’ from its “Frankenstein”,
then its military has to concede. The ‘mother of all
battles’ must go on with enhanced ferocity. The
blitzkrieg of Rah-i-Nijat needs to be accomplished
within six to eight weeks, because of the impending winter.
End of November would bring in snow to the region.
Tactically speaking, the US-led NATO Army has to aid the
ongoing operation from the Afghan side.
Rah-i-Nijat means the “path to
deliverance”. To really deliver, the operation not only
needs verbal braggadocio by the military elite but a serious
rethinking and reconsideration of their role in
strengthening the ‘security sphere’ in South Asia. It is
high time Pakistan eschews the jabberwocky of the ‘Indian
threat’. Then only can the Taliban and the Al Qaeda be
dragooned.
October 24, 2009
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