In observing the behaviour of a mouse while it forages for sustenance, it displays a compulsive affection for right realisation or identification of itself in its surroundings essential for a feeling of safety. The ‘feeling of safety’ is a real experience that would satisfy a subject affection for preservation of its life. Should the mouse hear approaching footsteps, it will stop everything and scurry away for cover, proving the dominant appetitive affection to be that for preservation of its life, determinative, as with all motions of appetite, of practical subject realised concepts of ‘that to do’ in the realised circumstances.
The solution to the riddle of how the mouse appears to be affected by the abstraction ‘life’ as a principle of action is that the affection for ‘life’ that forms and structures the mouse, without any subject action that is discernible, has that grasp of the concept ‘life’. Just as the affection for ‘life’ is formative of the mouse from conception, and prior to it, all the mouse parts and systems functioning in real terms, so the mouse subject generated within the mouse form is compelled by the same life affection to act as it does in appetitive affective rightness realisation, or identification, in which the affection for the abstraction ‘life’ is imparted to the mouse subject in real terms of an appetitive affection for rightness realisation or identification.
In displaying an affection for preservation of its life, therefore, the animal life form is in affection of identification, whence through identification is imparted the specific appetitive response that preserves its life. The affection for ‘life’ is thus the realising affection for identification, being subject by nature, and is moved in every waking moment of the life form.
The end experience of any motion of subject appetitive affection is that of satiety, as in satiation of hunger or thirst, or in sexual accomplishment of action; or say, in the appetitive affection for completion of a job or project that is directed as to an experience of satiety by virtue of its completion. The subject experience of satiety is similar to the identification of an object as ‘that which it is’. Just as in identification of an object the subject life appetitive affection for right realisation is fulfilled, so in the experience of satiety a state of fulfilment as ‘that which it is’ is identified. In the experience of satiety of hunger, for example, no further subject compulsion is experienced in respect of the life appetite for food; though other subject life appetites, such as for security and sexual activity would still be latent in compelling of their respective fulfilment states, compelling subject realised affective idea forms of ‘that to do’ in the identified circumstances to arrive at a state of identification of ‘that which it is’ as fulfilment of that desired in the experience of satiety.
For any living creature, subject experienced appetitive need that compels the fulfilment experience of satiety is the extension of the virtual subject need compelling affective-type motions one observes in the interior processes of the body; in the development and multiplication of cells from the moment of fertilisation; then, in the more apparent functioning of internal bodily organs, which are formed and directed towards sustaining the life of the creature, but whose identified action can only be explained as compulsive towards a fulfilment state of ‘satiety’ as precluding further action, whereby an equilibrium is reached in the achieved state of that required; the production of enzymes and hormones, for example, is observed as a controlled measure in response to a stimulus, and then to cease, signifying a state of satiety of need. All this mirrors the life form subject appetitive affections that are directed to a state of satiety of need, and then cease in the experience of satiety.
Objectivity in things generally is a state of ‘that which it is’, the state of identity, which in the living form is achieved in subject perceptive realisation as a fulfilment of appetitive need whether in identifying objects and actions, as fulfilling the life appetitive affection for rightness realisation, or in identifying the experience of satiety of appetite as ‘that which it is’, whence no further action is compelled for the time being. Internally, the same process of identification as ‘that which it is’ regulates the motions and functions of bodily cells and organs. The identification of ‘that which it is’ is a rightness realisation bespeaking an affection, as in the life form subject where the affection for rightness realisation is at once a subject realisation. Thus all identification, implicit in the identity of objects as they exist affecting one another, implies a rightness realising or life subject affection.
The phenomenon of identification is taken for granted in our view of reality, but it is an abstraction that controls reality, without which there could be no reality. Identity implies an absolute all things come to be defined as, bespeaking a contextual definition of them that indicates an absolute contextual quality bequeathed to them, whereby as identities they are the manifestation of the implicitly subject contextual affection that forms them to act and mutually affect other identity forms in that same contextual affection. Contextual affection implies, as in life form appetitive affection for rightness realisation, a subject nature, whereby realisation manifested in identity is a subject function.
I repeat, we can only speak of identity as subject realised, where the realising affection is by nature subject. Conversely, identity of form in any context bespeaks a realising subject affection. For example, the identity of form of all created things bespeaks a realising subject affection that contextually acts bringing out ‘that which it is’ in identity forms.
The contextual subject affection is one for realisation of ‘that which is’ in every existing form as ‘that which it is’. In life forms, the rightness realising (identifying) affection is of a subject nature that proves to be one preserving of the life form’s life, thus, a life affection. Likewise, the creative contextual affection, by virtue of being a rightness realising affection, is a life affection. In other words, all realising affection is a motion of a living subject, be it of creator or creature.
